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Grupo Fasma v. The Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct. of the State of NV, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 29 (Apr. 21,
2016)1
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Service of Process; Foreign Company; Hague Convention
Summary
Merely because service of process complies with the Hague Convention does not necessarily
mean that it complies with constitutional Due Process. Here, the district court failed to conduct
adequate fact-finding necessary to determine whether service of process complied with
constitutional Due Process. Accordingly, the Court issued a writ of prohibition instructing the
district court to vacate its order denying Grupo’s motion to quash so that an evidentiary hearing
may be held on the matter.
Background
In this matter, B.E. Uno, LLC (“Uno”) owned a shopping center in Las Vegas, NV. Famsa, Inc.
(“Famsa”) leased commercial retail space at the shopping center. Petitioner Grupo Famsa
(“Grupo”), a publicly traded Mexican company, guaranteed the Famsa lease. Famsa failed to
comply with the lease and Uno filed a complaint against both Famsa and Grupo in district court
for breach of the lease and the guaranty.
Because both the United States and Mexico are signatories to the Hague Convention, Uno served
Grupo through the procedures outlined in the Hague Convention. These procedures include
designating a “Central Authority” in the country of service who will then serve the defendant
according to its own local laws. Here, the Mexican Central Authority issued service upon a
woman named Claudia Palomo Martinez stating that she was an employee in Grupo’s legal
department. Grupo filed a motion to quash service, stating that Martinez is a hostess employed to
greet customers.
Grupo argued that because Martinez is not an agent, officer, or representative of Grupo, service
of process was constitutionally deficient. Uno argued that service complied with both Mexican
law and the Hague Convention. The district court denied Grupo’s motion to quash stating that
Grupo was properly served under Mexican law and the Hague Convention, and that service
satisfied constitutional Due Process.
Discussion
Grupo argued that service of process was constitutionally deficient because Martinez was not an
agent, officer, or representative so integrated within Grupo. Uno counter argued that American
Due Process was incorporated into the Hague Convention, and thus, satisfying the requirements
of the Hague Convention satisfied constitutional Due Process. The Nevada Supreme Court
rejected Uno’s argument but also rejected Grupo's standard for what constitutes constitutional
service of process.
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Due Process requires notice that is reasonably calculated “to apprise the interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”2 Thus, while
it is relevant whether a person receiving process for Grupo is an agent, officer, or representative
of Grupo, it is only useful in determining whether notice was reasonable calculated to inform
Grupo of the pendency of action. Thus, Martinez need not have been an agent, officer, or
representative, if service was reasonably calculated to inform Grupo of the action.
Additionally, a certificate of compliance by a foreign nation’s central authority does not
necessarily satisfy constitutional Due Process. Merely because the Hague Convention applies,
does not necessitate that a constitutional inquiry is inappropriate or unnecessary. The Court
further acknowledged that many jurisdictions have held that whether service complies with the
Constitution is a separate question from whether service complies with the Hague Convention.
Therefore, the Court holds that where the Hague Convention applies, service of process must
comply with both the Constitution and the Hague Convention. Thus, while Uno may have abided
by the service procedures of the Hague Convention, the Mexican Central Authority’s service
efforts may have been constitutionally insufficient. Accordingly, an evidentiary hearing is
appropriate to determine whether Uno’s service was reasonably calculated to apprise Grupo of
the pendency of the action.
Conclusion
A certificate of compliance from a foreign nation’s central authority does not guarantee
compliance with constitutional Due Process. Here, the district court failed to conduct necessary
fact-finding to determine whether service of process complied with constitutional Due Process
requirements. Accordingly, the Court issued a writ of prohibition instructing the district court to
vacate its order denying Grupo’s motion to quash service of process so that an evidentiary
hearing may be held on the matter.
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